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Preface
In the past several decades historians have expressed doubt 
about the validity of a Pax Britannica. The point of entry for 
this research was an impression that such doubts seemed, 
first, to be part of a general trend of projecting the decline 
of Britain’s power and influence onto an earlier era, and sec-
ond, to have sprung from a mistaken conception of British 
objectives. The trailblazing work of Andrew Lambert on the 
capabilities of the traditional British sailing fleet and new 
British naval technologies in the nineteenth century raised 
further suspicion that the British power employed to influ-
ence other nations was being overlooked.
The period at the beginning of Queen Victoria’s reign, 
1838 to 1846, provides ample opportunities for testing the 
idea that Britain could and did use its navy effectively to ac-
complish diplomatic and commercial goals. It contained in-
stances of Britain threatening naval force (against the United 
States and France) and actually using it (against China and 
Egypt). This period also ushered in an era of swift techno-
logical change, as the Royal Navy and its competitors adopt-
ed steam-powered warships. It was long enough after the Na-
poleonic Wars to be free of the idiosyncrasies of immediate 
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postwar naval policy. And, finally, existing historical studies 
scarcely address the relationship of Britain’s naval capabili-
ties to its foreign policy in this period.
Because British foreign policymaking was not bureaucra-
tized in the mid-nineteenth century, much of the substance 
of decision making could not be found in official dispatches 
and records. Thus, the majority of my research focused on 
the private correspondence, notes, and journals of statesmen, 
drawing out the goals and strategies of British policy and the 
ways in which it was often implemented by naval power.
This volume aims to demonstrate through three case stud-
ies—of North America, China, and the Mediterranean—that 
Britain influenced other nations with its navy, but it always 
did so with the ultimate goals of preserving peace, stability, 
and British diplomatic freedom. The apparent contradictions 
of this defensive policy based on offensive capabilities offer in-
triguing insights into the ways a dominant world power cal-
culated its interests and decided whether to exercise its na-
val supremacy.
Several of the quotations in this book include variant spell-
ings, which have been preserved in their original forms. The 
ruler of Egypt during the Syrian Crisis is thus referred to here 
as Mehemet Ali, rather than Mohammed Ali, following the 
spellings and conventions used by early Victorian British of-
ficials. Chinese person and place names are transliterated in 
pinyin style, with the exception of quotations and map labels, 
which will contain the original transliteration of the sources, 
and the commonly used Wade-Giles place names Canton, Pe-
king, and Nanking. Translations of French quotations have been 
provided by Dominique Poncelet except where otherwise noted.
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chapter one
British Power in the Early Victorian Period
In 1893 Joseph Chamberlain popularized the term Pax Britannica to describe an era that had begun with the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815.1 Although Chamberlain 
intended the phrase to explain the pacifying effects of Brit-
ain’s rule in India, it eventually came to be understood as 
the broader phenomenon whereby Britain’s overwhelming 
strength enforced global peace from Napoleon’s defeat until 
the late nineteenth century. Britain’s commercial, industrial, 
financial, and imperial might, all protected by the superior 
Royal Navy, were so imposing that they deterred war, either 
by compelling other nations and peoples to defer to Britain’s 
will, or at least by inviting them to bask in the safety afforded 
by a navy that upheld the status quo. The absence of large, 
general European wars gave credence to the concept.
The idea of a Pax Britannica, however, seems to have gone 
out with the British Empire itself. Since the 1960s the general 
consensus has held that the concept is misleading at best. 
Whether critics address the notion of Pax Britannica directly 
or speculate on it in larger discussions of British foreign 
policy, naval power, or empire, they usually emphasize that 
Britain had only limited means of exercising power at the 
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time, and that British military or naval strength played little 
role in preserving peace.
Two questions arise about the concept of a Pax Britannica. 
The first concerns the Pax part of the term: was the period 
from 1815 to 1880 really as peaceful as the phrase implies? 
As many historians have pointed out, the answer is a decided 
no. True, there was no great European war in this period. The 
Crimean War (1853–56) was the only conflict between more 
than two great powers, and it was fairly limited in terms of 
participants, length, and geographic scope. Still, numerous 
other military occupations, naval demonstrations, bombard-
ments, blockades, and small wars went on throughout the 
world during the so-called Pax.2 Britain took part in many 
such operations, and although they have been labeled wars 
of a “remote colonial kind,” they were not always remote or 
colonial, as the Syrian Crisis in the Mediterranean and near 
war with the United States make clear.3 Although one should 
keep in mind that many nations, especially Britain, used or 
threatened to use armed force throughout much of the century, 
most historians still consider this period something special.4 
It stands in marked contrast to the eighteenth century, when 
lengthy coalition wars were commonplace and their recur-
rence was a continual threat in times of peace. Perhaps the 
Pax of the nineteenth century was not entirely peaceful, but 
Europe was relatively free of general wars.
The second question regarding Pax Britannica pertains 
to the Britannica portion of the term: was this peace a Brit-
ish peace? That is, did Great Britain possess power that was 
dominant and penetrating enough to impose its will in serious 
diplomatic disputes? And was it therefore able to preserve 
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peace, protect its interests, and deter potential competitors? 
Most scholars in the past several decades have also answered 
no to these questions when applied to great power relations. 
They often acknowledge the relative strength of the Royal Navy 
and note Britain’s successful “gunboat diplomacy” against 
smaller states.5 They might recognize Britain’s commercial 
and industrial superiority and its empire, all of which provided 
it with resources for a war, especially at sea.6 But most doubt 
that Britain’s use of naval and military force — or its threat to 
use force — played any significant role in European affairs, 
even if it may have helped facilitate peace in the wider world. 
They instead emphasize that a naval power like Britain could 
not influence continental powers because it lacked a large 
army and ultimately needed the help of a continental ally that 
had one. Continental states were supposedly invulnerable to 
blockades or cannon fire, much less to mere intimidation 
by a fleet, because they are assumed to have had expansive 
armies, internal lines of communication, and self-sufficient 
economies. So Britain could only interfere from the sidelines, 
and the peace of Europe instead depended on a European 
concert.7 Diplomatic histories of the period point to balance-
of-power politics in a European system, not naval power, as 
being responsible for peace.8
Demonstrating Britain’s inability to exercise power usually 
involves listing diplomatic incidents in which Britain did not 
intervene with force. Historians have interpreted these occa-
sions as evidence that Britain was unable to make its power 
felt, and as proof, therefore, that British naval dominance (at 
least in the developed world) was an illusion. The examples 
given include Britain’s supposed failures to stop France’s 
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incursion into Spain in 1825, to intervene to resolve the Maine-
New Brunswick boundary question with the United States 
in the early 1840s, to use the Royal Navy to win the Crimean 
War, or to prevent Prussia’s occupation of Schleswig-Holstein 
in 1864. In effect, each situation in which a historian has 
judged that Britain had reason to act but did not becomes an 
exhibit in the case against the capacity of British naval power 
to exert any influence at all.9 However, many works do not 
address disputes that involved the threat of force or limited 
action short of war, nor do they go beyond lists to analyze 
whether Britain did in fact require a continental ally with a 
great army to influence European politics or keep the peace.
Having raised doubts about its naval and military capabili-
ties, historians often credit Britain’s dominant position from 
1815 to 1880 to “circumstances” resulting from the Napole-
onic Wars. The lengthy coalition wars stimulated Britain’s 
industry and increased its national wealth, while they shut 
the other great powers (both opponents and allies) out of 
overseas markets, detached their imperial territories, sucked 
their treasuries dry, and damaged their infrastructures.10 In 
this scenario Britain seems to have experienced a cycle in 
which its economic and financial dominance — boosted by 
the great wars — sustained its relative naval supremacy, which 
in turn protected its economic and financial health. Britain’s 
superior economic strength translated (seemingly automati-
cally) into a big, strong navy and the ability to outlast enemies 
in a war, both of which made Britain more powerful than 
its European competitors. Britain’s wartime naval successes 
might also have been useful to bluff later on. Relying on its 
rivals’ memories of Adm. Viscount Horatio Nelson’s exploits, 
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the Royal Navy could exercise more influence than its actual 
strength should have allowed.11
All of these arguments note Britain’s post-1815 assets, but 
they emphasize “negative” reasons for Britain’s relative power 
and the period of general peace. Circumstances were benign 
for Britain, these arguments posit, and great power rivals 
simply did not bother to compete.12 The implication that other 
European states could have altered their economic and indus-
trial situations at any time, had they decided to do so, adds 
an element of political will to the power equation. Exhausted 
after 1815, European rulers were conservative, mindful of 
their countries’ frailties, and intent on solving their domestic 
economic and social problems.13 Mutual suspicions (and lin-
gering distrust of France) discouraged them from cooperating 
to contest Britain’s naval and imperial lead and offered Britain 
opportunities to play the powers against each other diplomati-
cally.14 In this view the great powers’ choice not to challenge 
Britain was grounded in their dedication to the status quo in 
Europe. Because Britain was the only economic and naval 
powerhouse left standing after 1815, this commitment was 
the true cause of both peace and British dominance.
Happily, this argument continues, British policies offered 
European states positive reasons to either become Britain’s 
allies or simply tolerate its relative supremacy. Britain’s general 
commitment to peace and its choice to use naval mastery to 
promote free trade helped everyone. Other powers might not 
like Britain’s command of the sea, but they put aside their 
objections with a view toward material gain.15
If Britain’s dominance was merely circumstantial, and if it 
could not decisively affect continental nations with its navy, 
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then perhaps British power played only a marginal role in 
preserving peace, and the real credit should go to the Concert 
of Europe. Sometimes the concert seems built on a new spirit 
of cooperation after 1815, in which states generally agreed on 
objectives and international rules. The rules and the powers’ 
mutual interest in preserving a concert kept the peace. Others 
argue that the system worked not only because of consensus 
on the need for a balance of power, but also because the pow-
ers could shift their alliances within the system for different 
purposes without war.16
But could the European system really have operated with no 
consideration for the relative strength of its member states? 
Britain played a key role in upholding the concert because of 
its relative strength. The powers’ willingness to act to enforce 
peace and the status quo was vital to preserving equilibrium, 
and Britain could take that action. It has even been suggested 
that the peaceful European system disintegrated largely be-
cause Britain decided after the Crimean War to abandon its 
tradition of active involvement in Europe.17 Since it is un-
likely that Britain’s participation in the concert was necessary 
simply because of the nation’s moral weight, its importance 
was likely based on real power: naval strength backed by 
economic and financial strength. Britain was disproportion-
ately responsible for maintaining the system because it was 
the one great power that possessed the ability to influence 
Europe — it could “mobiliz[e] resources to alter the behavior 
of others”18 — but also lacked the continental ambitions that 
would have made it dangerous and destabilizing.
Much work of the past fifty years has been an inevitable 
revision of overly whiggish assumptions about British imperial 
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power, but its emphasis on circumstances and limited British 
naval power went too far. A more recent rethinking of the Royal 
Navy’s role in the Crimean War opens the door to reconsider-
ing Britain’s naval capabilities and the ways in which power 
upheld both British interests and a Pax Britannica.
The widely held belief outlined above often centered on 
the example of the Royal Navy’s apparent ineffectiveness 
in the Crimean War. The common view supposed that only 
armies — and those mostly French — were able to beat Rus-
sia into submission. Fresh interpretations, however, show 
that the Royal Navy played the decisive part in winning the 
war. It carried and supplied the allied army in the Crimea 
for year and a half, devastated Russia’s economy with its 
blockade, and smashed several Russian fortresses on its way 
to threatening Cronstadt, the Baltic fortress guarding the 
capital, St. Petersburg. This threat, made possible by steam 
warships, forced the tsar’s government to accept terms that 
crippled Russia’s naval power and its sway in eastern Europe 
for decades to come.19 Evidence that Britain’s naval capabili-
ties were so effective against the archetypal land power casts 
doubt on notions of limited British power. Moreover, France 
and the United States were vulnerable to the Royal Navy as 
well, and they all built coastal defenses to protect themselves 
against the sea power they so feared.20
British power and British goals, therefore, deserve to be 
reassessed. The assumption that Britain’s naval power was 
inadequate and ineffective because Britain did not constantly 
exercise it in blockades, bombardments, or actual wars against 
continental states misses the point. The Royal Navy’s main 
role in the nineteenth century was to be a deterrent force, 
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and it played that role skillfully. With its intimidating fleet 
afloat — especially after steam technology enhanced its in-
shore operations — its great reserves and shipbuilding capac-
ity, and its secure financial, economic, and political supports, 
Britain’s navy was visible and credible. British naval power 
posed a genuine threat, but British governments exercised 
discretion in using it. On some occasions they chose not to 
act, but inaction did not necessarily mean that the British 
battle fleet was too weak to assert British influence. When 
they chose to, British leaders used the navy to signal their 
intentions, warning other nations away in conflicts that en-
dangered British interests. British statesmen were prepared 
to use its force to guard Britain’s interests — and maintenance 
of peace was, generally speaking, one of those interests — but 
they rarely needed to do so.21
If one takes deterrence as Britain’s main foreign policy 
strategy in this era, a scarcity of naval actions would be a mea-
sure of its success. British policy in North America, China, 
and the Mediterranean from 1838 to 1846 reveals the ways 
British leaders considered British interests and applied na-
val and military force rationally and discreetly. With respect 
to power, British capabilities were greater than are usually 
assumed, and British statesmen of the time knew how to 
employ these capabilities while recognizing their limits. As 
for British interests, historians have sometimes neglected 
Britain’s real objectives and important factors involved in 
decision making. Situations in which Britain did not use force 
should be reconsidered, and its goals and methods should 
be explored rather than passed over in a presumption that 
British naval power was insufficient.
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Examining Britain’s handling of force — both its threat 
and its use — can aid in understanding the nation’s power 
capabilities and its primary goals. This will provide a clearer 
picture of British power and policy during the period from 
1838 to 1846, a period in which British governments con-
fronted several crises that demanded decisions on the use 
of naval force. It will also suggest that British power created 
at least some of the circumstances that shaped the attitudes 
of European powers. What follows aims not only to put the 
Britannica back into Pax Britannica, but also to show how 
Britain’s influence, whether in Europe or the wider world, 
derived not just from industrial, financial, and commercial 
dominance, but from naval power as well.
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